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THE DILEMMA OF RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION AND
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
RICHARD J. REGAN,

S.J.*

L ST

JUNE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT struck down the
mandatory reading of the Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer
in the public schools.' Mr. Justice Clark, who delivered the opinion of
the Court in the case of School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
explicitly rested the decision on the principle that "in the relationship
between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of
neutrality." 2 Briefly stated, the principle of neutrality, as embodied in the
establishment clause of the first amendment, would prohibit both federal
and state governments from favoring one religious belief over another,
or all religious beliefs over disbelief, or disbelief over religious belief.
Mr. Justice Clark explained the test of neutrality in terms of the purpose
and primary effect of a legislative enactment:

If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
3
advances nor inhibits religion.
In other words, a governmental accommodation of religion would offend
the establishment clause if by a deliberate design or a built-in weighting
the accommodation would prefer belief over nonbelief.
The Court's essay at precise definition, which echoed the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland, wisely
transcended the sterile invocation of a metaphoric "wall" of separation or
the linguistic strait jacket of an impossibly "absolute" separation of
church and state which characterized so much of the discussion in
* A.B., St. Peter's College; LL.B., Harvard Law School; Ph.L., Woodstock College.

School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,374 U.S. 203 (1963).
at 226.
3 Id. at 222.
2 Id.
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earlier cases.4 The Court's definition recognized by implication that, as a matter of
historical record and social imperative, the
concerns of religion and government perforce interact. What the Court did in the
Abington decision was to set up a clear
norm to distinguish impermissible from
permissible interactions.
Since Pennsylvania had sponsored the
unquestionably religious exercises present in
the Abington case, the Court's decision to
strike them was an unassailable conclusion
from the principle of neutrality. Many
theists, of course, challenge this principle on
which the recent decision rested. Yet seven
major Supreme Court decisions since 1947,
over the dissent or reservation of a small
minority, have rightly rejected the challenge.' Religious belief cannot be a criterion
of citizenship in a pluralistic democracy.
This is the only acceptable meaning of the
first amendment which is politically consistent with the fact that many of our citizens profess belief in a nontheistic secular
humanism. If all citizens are to enter the
democratic political process as equals, they
cannot be distinguished at the outset on
4 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion

in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 at
461-67 (1961). For earlier discussion, see Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 at 317 (1952) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.); Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 at
211, 212 at 231 (1948) (opinions of Black, J., and
Frankfurter, J., respectively); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 at 16, 18 at 26, 28 at 29 (1947)
(opinion of Black, J., dissenting opinions of Jackson, J., and Rutledge, J., respectively).
5 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 1; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961);
McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 4; Zorach v.
Clauson, supra note 4; Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., supra note 4; Everson v. Board
of Educ., supra note 4. Reservation was expressed
by Mr. Justice Reed in McCollum and by Mr.
Justice Stewart in Engel.

the basis of their fundamental value commitments. Harmony among all citizens as
equal partners in the democratic process
demands that religious disbelief receive the
same political status as religious belief.
Hence, the same political consideration
which requires the equality before the law of
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish beliefs applies as well to nonbelief.
Neutrality is not a philosophical principle
which reflects secularist presuppositions but
rather a political principle - elevated, of
course, to legal and constitutional status by
the first amendment - which reflects the
exigencies of a pluralistic democracy.
American society is a fragile composite of
Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and secular
humanists, and their subscription to articles of peace is an essential and necessary
prerequisite to the fulfillment of civic aspirations. If the believer finds the principle of
neutrality unpalatable, it is because he confuses the political and theological orders.
The equality before the law of all religious
beliefs and disbelief is not an article of religious faith but an article of political peace.
The Constitution does not require citizens
to profess that all religious belief and disbelief are equal in the eyes of God, but it
does require citizens to accept that all religious beliefs and disbelief are equal in the
eyes of the state. Such a settlement has
proved necessary for even a minimum
achievement of political goals in our pluralist and democratic society.
In the aftermath of the Abington case, a
critical re-examination of released-time programs for voluntary religious instruction is,
in my opinion, imperative. The principle of
neutrality which the Court in the Abington
case authoritatively sanctioned, fully articulated, and logically followed, raises the question whether the public schools may permit
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voluntary religious instruction during school
hours where at least one equally attractive
alternative is available to nonparticipants.
According to the common interpretation,
the decision in the case of Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ. prohibited all
such instruction at least when conducted on
the public school premises, although the
decision in the case of Zorach v. Clauson
modified the previous case to the extent of
permitting the classes provided they are
6
conducted off the public school premises.
In the Abington case, all five opinions expressed or implied agreement with the
McCollum decision. Mr. Justice Clark assigned religion to the home, the church,
and the individual; his obvious silence on
the place of religion in the school appeared
to imply a broad acceptance of McCollum.Mr. Justice Douglas repeated his contention, first broached in the case of Engel v.
Vitale," that the establishment clause prohihibited all use of public funds for religious
purposes; presumably he would consider
any religious instruction on public property
to fall under that prohibition. 9 Mr. Justice
Brennan expressly defended the McCollum
decision on the ground that the released-time
program there involved "placed the religious instructor in the public school classroom in precisely the position of authority
held by the regular teachers of secular subjects. . . ."0 Mr. Justice Goldberg implied
concurrence with the McCollum decision by
acknowledging "the propriety . . . of the

6 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 4; Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 4.
'School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 1, at 226.
8 Supra note 5.
9School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 1, at 229-30.

'l"d. at 262.

teaching about religion, as distinguished
from the teaching of religion, in the public
schools."" Even Mr. Justice Stewart, who
dissented, incongruously endorsed McCollum "because of the coercive effect which the
use by religious sects of a compulsory school
system would necessarily have upon the
children involved" and because of the "government support of proselytizing activities
of religious sects by throwing the weight of
secular authority behind the dissemination
of religious tenets." 2
Despite this imposing array of judicial
authority, I suggest that the constitutional
exclusion of voluntary sectarian religious instruction from the public schools where an
equally attractive alternative is available to
nonparticipants does not follow logically
from the principle of neutrality. Indeed, in
my opinion, such an exclusion would rather
prefer disbelief over belief. Here we must
recall the central principle of the case of
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, that the child
is not "the mere creature of the state" and
that parents enjoy the primary right, duty,
and responsibility to educate the child.",
The state's role in public education, therefore, is secondary and subordinate to that of
the parents; its task is to support rather
than supplant parental choice. This is not
to say that the state may not act where
parents default or may not specify the minimum secular education required to fulfill
civic aims. But the state may not treat the
child, inside or outside the public school, as
its own autonomous and impersonal handiwork. To invert the roles of parent and
state would establish the educational Leviathan of political absolution.

11
Id. at 306.
2Id. at 314.
3 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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Failure to understand clearly the respective educational roles of the parent and
the state necessarily blurs the distinction
between state sponsorship and state permission of religious instruction in public education which, in my view, is constitutionally
critical. As a result, every phrase of the public schools is conceived simply as a state
activity and every released-time program a
constitutionally forbidden religious activity
of the state. This reasoning may explain why
McCollum and subsequent decisions have
failed to make a straight-forward distinction
between state-sponsored and state-accommodated religious instruction. 14 If the pub-

lic school offers pupils the opportunity of
voluntary religious instruction at the request of their parents, then the public
authority is simply executing its substitutional relationship to the parents. The public
authority is not endorsing religious education; rather, it is permitting pupils to obtain
the education which their parents have
chosen for them insofar as this is administratively feasible within the general civic
aims of public education.
Thus understood, neither the purpose nor
the primary effect of a released-time program is religious. Of course, there is an incidental benefit to religious activity, but
this is not prohibited by the principle of
neutrality. The purpose and primary effect
are rather to honor the primacy of parental
rights in the education of children. The
public authority, which operates and controls the educational framework of the public schools as the surrogate of the parents,
Engel adverted specifically to the state composition and imposition of the Regents' Prayer, but
gave no indication that state-accommodated religious instruction under proper circumstances
would be constitutionally acceptable. Engel v.
Vitale, supra note 4, at 425.
14

simply accommodates the reasonable wish
of parents to specify religious instruction
for their own children.
To deny that public schools may allow
parents to choose an elective of religious instruction would in fact establish secularism
as the religion of our public schools. The
public authority would then act to prevent
parents from selecting a feasible amount of
religious instruction as part of the formal
education of their children. In other words,
the public schools would be required to exclude religious instruction from the education even of those who desire it. The product
of such a policy would not be the neutrality
of the government between belief and disbelief; the government would rather place
the heavy weight of its authority in public
education solely on the side of the secular
humanist creed.
Mr. Justice Black in both McCollum and
Zorach insisted that released-time for voluntary religious instruction invoked the
state's compulsory education laws to assist
religious sects. "Pupils compelled by law to
go to school for secular education," he explained, were "released in part from their
legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. ' ' 15 In his view,

the state thus made religious sects the beneficiaries of its education laws. Mr. Justice
Jackson in his dissent in Zorach voiced a
similar complaint, that the state first compelled each student "to yield a large part of
his time for public secular education," and
then released some of it to him "on condition that he devote it to sectarian religious
purposes."'16 Thus, the truant officer would
dog the youngster who failed to attend his
religious instruction classes.
15 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,

supra note 4, at 209-10.
16 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 4, at 323-24.
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But I submit that Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Jackson have misread the
compulsory education laws, and that the
misreading conflicts with the primacy of
parental rights recognized in the Piercedecision. Compulsory education laws require
only that a child secure formal schooling
which includes the secular education specified as necessary to fulfill the duties of citizenship. The laws do not require that a
child's formal schooling be exclusively secular. The state does not ask that parents exclude religious instruction from their child's
formal education. A child can fulfill the
state's requirement of secular instructions
by attendance at a church-related school
without any implication that the state thus
acts to make beneficiaries of the churches.
Surely the compulsory education laws
would not operate any more to favor the
churches if a child fulfilled the state's requirement of secular instruction by attendance at a public school where religious instruction was available. Indeed, the Pierce
decision established the general right of
parents to obtain for their child the education of their choice on the view that those
who nurture the child and direct his destiny
"have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.' 1 7 In the light of that decision
and its philosophy of parental primacy, I
do not see how the state's compulsory education laws could constitutionally insist on
the exclusion of voluntary religious instruction as part of a child's formal schooling.
Of course, religious instruction at home
and at church remains freely and fully available to children attending public schools.
This availability obviously limits the hostile

effect of excluding voluntary religious instruction from the public schools. But it does
not serve to refute, as Mr. Justice Clark
implied for the Court in the Abington case,
the charge that such an exclusion would
establish the "religion of secularism" within
the public schools.' The believer is equal to
the nonbeliever inside as well as outside the
public school, and the believing parent
retains the primary right to the formal as
well as the informal schooling of his child as
far as administratively feasible within the
general civic aims of public education.
Hence, the Constitution cannot be interpreted consistently with the principle of neutrality to prohibit the child, whose parents
so wish, from receiving religious instruction
within the framework of his formal education in the public school where an equally
attractive alternative is available to nonparticipants.
The actual effect of excluding voluntary
religious instruction from the public schools
is far more serious than Mr. Justice Clark
has recognized. Today the family and the
church are not generally well adapted to
shoulder alone the burden of religious education. The complexity and mobility of modern society with its resulting dislocations
render the family and the church less adequate than in the past to transmit religious
values within their own self-contained structures. Few parents today are themselves prepared to give religious instruction, and few
families are organized in a way to sustain
the instruction once undertaken. Nor is the
place and framework of the church in our
society much better suited to pierce the
child's absorption in the modern world of
accelerated activity. But the school appears

17 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535

18 School Dist. of Abington Township

(1925).

supra note 1, at 225.
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to offer an institution structured to accomplish what neither the home nor the church
can now do by themselves. This is why parents of religious conviction are anxious to
find a place for religious instruction within
the formal education which their children
receive in the public schools.
Mr. Justice Brennan admitted in the
Abington case that "parents remain morally
and constitutionally free to choose the academic environment in which they wish their
children to be educated." 19 But that choice,
in his view, was simply between a public
secular and a private sectarian education.
The state could not "inhibit that freedom of
choice by diminishing the attractiveness of
either alternative - either by restricting the
liberty of the private schools to inculcate
whatever values they wish, or by jeopardizing the freedom of the public schools from
private or sectarian pressures." 0 Hence, the
parent who sends his child to the public
school willingly accepts "an atmosphere free
of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences" and cannot fairly complain of the
exclusion of religious instruction. Thus did
Mr. Justice Brennan seek to avoid the charge
that the exclusion of religious influences
from public education violated the parental
rights of believers and preferred disbelief
over religious belief.
Mr. Justice Brennan was certainly correct
to insist on the free exercise of parental
choice in the education of children. His own
explanation would have sounded more
plausible if the parents of children attending
church-related schools received recompense
from the state for their contribution to the
educational requirements of citizenship. But,
as the situation now stands, parents are not
19 Id. at 242.
20 Ibid.

confronted with the equally attractive alternatives of public and private schools; they
may choose a religiously oriented education
for their children only if they or their fellow
religionists can afford it. Even if the state
did support parents' choice of a religiously
oriented school to fulfill secular educational
goals, by what right should the child of the
believer be forced to leave the public school
in order to obtain religious instruction as
part of his formal education? The believer is
equal to the nonbeliever inside as well as
outside the public school, and the believing
parent retains the primary right to the reasonable specification of religious instruction
within as well as without the formal education of his child in the public school. By the
same logic, of course, an equally attractive
alternative to religious instruction must be
available to those who may wish not to
participate.
What lay behind Mr. Justice Brennan's
sharp dichotomy between public and private
schools was the philosophy "that the public
schools serve a uniquely public function: the
training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an atmosphere
in which children may assimilate a heritage
common to all American groups and religions." 21 But the implication that religion is
a "parochial, divisive, or separatist" influence against which it is the unique public
function of the school to protect the child is
a thinly veiled profession of secularist philosophy hardly consistent with the principle
of neutrality. Unwittingly but no less certainly, Mr. Justice Brennan assumed the
secularist argument that the sectarian religious instruction of children is somehow
dangerous to the cause of civic virtue. The
21

Id. at 241-42.
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demands of pluralism embodied in the principle of neutrality do indeed forbid the democratic state to sponsor religious exercises
or instruction designed as a common program for all students in the public schools.
That was the decision in the Regents' Prayer
and Bible-reading cases. But the demands of
pluralism and the principle of neutrality also
forbid the democratic state to claim a unique
public function for the exclusion of religious
influences in the training of citizens. The
only influences prohibited by the principle
of neutrality are those sponsored by the state
herself. For the state to assert the exclusion
of religious instruction from the public
schools as her own proper and indeed unique
function would brand sectarian religion an
enemy of the state and, of course, thus violate the principle of neutrality.
The proposition that the public school is
committed exclusively to secular education
was not novel to Mr. Justice Brennan. Mr.
Justice Jackson had declared as early as
Everson that the public school was "organized on the premise that secular education
can be isolated from all religious teaching," 2 and Mr. Justice Clark cited that passage with apparent approval in the Abington
case. 23 Similarly, Mr. Justice Brennan's concept of the public school's "uniquely public
function" reflected the opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in McCollum that:
The public school is at once the symbol of
our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny.
In no activity of the State is it more vital to

22 Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 4, at
23-24.
23 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 1, at 218. We should note, however,
that the citation of Mr. Justice Jackson in Abington looks chiefly to support the general principle

of governmental neutrality in matters of religion.
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keep out divisive forces than in its school
24

From this view of the public school, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter could only conclude
that released-time for religious instruction
inculcated in nonparticipants "a feeling of
separatism when the school should be the
training ground for habits of community
"25

Unfortunately, the philosophy of education which regards the public school as the
unique vehicle of natural unity is altogether
too dominant. In the name of democracy
this philosophy would make the public
school the community's agency of conformity rather than the parents' representative
and thus establish the public school as a
secular temple to initiate the young in communal worship. It would supplant rather
than support parental choice in the religious
instruction of children and prefer collective
uniformity to individual freedom. In short,
this philosophy of education would promote
state absolutism rather than liberal humanism.
Political unity and community harmony
are, of course, values to be cherished, but
they should not be purchased at the price of
parents' freedom of educational choice in
matters of religious belief. Any real attempt
to achieve political harmony and cohesive
unity in a pluralistic society like the American must respect this primacy of parental
rights. There are surely other ways in which
our civic communion of mind, heart, and
action can be fostered without sacrificing so
fundamental a principle. In this respect, the
success of the present ecumenical movement
is instructive. No attempt is made there to

24

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,

supra note 4, at 231.
25d. at 227.
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hide genuine differences of belief but only to
overcome religious separation through charity. The open presence of religious differences in the public schools may likewise
help, more than an "ostrich posture," to
move students out of isolation into communication, out of estrangement into understanding, and out of hostility into cooperation.
Similar to the claim that home, church,
and private school remain available for the
religious instruction of children whose parents so wish is the concession that objective
courses about religion are constitutionally
permissible in public education. Presuming
that a fruitful distinction can be drawn
between instruction about religion and religious instruction, why may not believers
choose the latter for their children? The
principle that parents have the primary right
to educate their children remains fundamental to any liberal philosophy of education.
Parents should be free, therefore, to specify
strictly religious instruction for their children as far as administratively feasible
within the general civic aims of public education.
Mr. Justice Brennan also argued in the
Abington case that religious instruction in
the public school classroom would place the
religious teacher "in precisely the position
of authority held by regular teachers of secular subjects," lend "to the support of sectarian instruction all the authority of the
governmentally operated public school system," and thus unconstitutionally augment
the "prestige and capacity" of the religious
teacher for influence.26 This argument, of
course, implies that all authority in the public school, whether of the secular or the reli26 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 262-63 (1963).

gious teacher, derives primarily from the
state and not from the parent. But such an
implication is completely at odds with the
fundamental philosophy of a free society
that the authority to educate the child rests
primarily with his parents. Once the primacy
of parental rights is recognized, then Mr.
Justice Brennan's argument falls. For the
mantle of authority which the religious
teacher, or indeed the secular teacher,
assumes in the public school classroom is
primarily parental and only secondarily
involves the state as the parents' surrogate.
As a matter of fact, if no academic credit is
given for the religious instruction, no pay to
the religious instructor, and recreation is
available to the student as an alternative, the
authority of the religious teacher in the public schools is by no means equal to that of
the secular teacher.
Although the language of Mr. Justice
Black's opinion in McCollum pinned that
decision in part on the use of the state's taxsupported public school buildings for the
dissemination of religious doctrines, 2 in the
Abington decision only Mr. Justice Douglas
thought the single fact of financial aid to
religious activity to be decisive.28 Indeed,
four members of the Court in the recent case
disavowed that test. Mr. Justice Brennan
expressly admitted that the public expenditures involved in the use of public school
classrooms, light, and heating for religious
instruction would not necessarily violate the
establishment clause.29 Mr. Justice Goldberg
and Mr. Justice Harlan defended the constitutionality of military chaplains and so im-

27 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 4, at 209, 212.
2S School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 26, at 229-30.
29 Id. at 261-62.
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plicitly accepted the validity of at least one
form of incidental financial aid to religious
activity. 30 Mr. Justice Stewart, in dissenting,
recalled the principle that the state could not
constitutionally discriminate against reli31
gious groups in the use of public property.
Even Mr. Justice Clark made it clear that he
did not base the Court's decision on the use
of public property for religious purposes and
reserved judgment on the constitutionality
of military chapels.

32

In my opinion, the justices rightly rejected
the position that any financial aid to religious activity by the state would constitute
an establishment of religion. As the state
may not discriminate in favor of one or all
religions, neither may it discriminate against
them. Thus, the state not only may but even
must permit religious organizations to make
an orderly use of public parks where these
33
are generally open to other civic groups.
So too the state should permit religious
groups to use public school property where
parents so request. The state in a free society
should recognize the primary right of parents to specify religious instruction for their
child as far as administratively feasible
within the general civic aims of public education. For the state to demand as a matter
of constitutional principle the exclusion of
such religious instruction would imply both
state absolutism in education and state hostility to religion. Nor does the expenditure of
public funds for light, heat, and application
forms appear as anything other than an
appropriation incidental to the accommodation of parental wishes. Similarly, the in30 Id. at 306.
31 Id. at 314.
32
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volvement of the public school in the
administration of the released-time program
is subordinate to the exercise of parental
choice. The essential issue is whether the
public authority may provide a place for
voluntary religious instruction within the
framework of public education. If it may do
so, then the use of public property, the
incurring of incidental expenses, and the
consequent administrative involvement are
constitutionally irrelevant.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended in
McCollum that released-time for religious
instruction during school hours created an
"obvious pressure upon children to attend." 34
Now, this contention may reflect the unarticulated premise that the state enjoys primary rights in the education of children, and
that as a consequence religious instruction
in the public schools can only be state-sponsored and state-endorsed. Or the contention
may echo the argument of Mr. Justice Black
that released-time programs employ the
state's compulsory education laws to compel
pupils to attend religious instruction. But
the contention may rather reflect the fear
that the majority choosing religious instruction would psychologically and socially pressure nonparticipants to conform. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter expressed the fear this way:
The law of imitation operates, and nonconformity is not an outstanding characteristic
of children. The result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend .... The children belonging to... nonparticipating sects
will thus have inculcated in them a feeling
of separatism ....

As a result... [released-

time] sharpens the consciousness of religious
differences at least among some of the children committed to... [the public school's]
care. These are consequences not amenable

Id. at 226 n.10.

33Cf. Fowler v.

Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951).

34 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
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to statistics. But they are precisely the consequences against which the Constitution
was directed .... 35
Many assert that "coercion" means
nothing more than physical or mental intimidation. Thus Mr. Justice Douglas in the
Regents' Prayer and Abington cases denied
that merely psychological and social pressure constituted coercion even though the
religious exercises there involved were certainly state-sponsored 6 In any case, whether
called "coercion" or not, the state cannot
consistently with the principle of neutrality
so weight a released-time program against
the nonparticipant as to pressure him to attend religious instruction. The question of
inherent weighting is this: Does a releasedtime program create built-in pressures on
students to participate antecedent to their
parents' choice?
Where the state sponsors religious exercises or fails to assure a truly equal alternative for the nonparticipant, the state, of
course, is the responsible agent for engendering the inherent pressure on students to
attend. But where the state is not the sponsor, and a truly equal alternative is available
to the nonparticipant, such psychological
and social pressures as come to bear on the
children of nonbelievers do not derive from
the state but solely from the consequences of
parental choice. The fact that children are
young and impressionable may change the
quantity but not the quality of the pressure;
that is still consequent upon the exercise of
parental choice and not built into the program itself. The public authorities are not

35 Id. at 227-28.
36 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 26, at 228-29; Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 438 (1962).

obliged to insulate children any more than
adults from an awareness of religious differences. Indeed, the state could not shelter
them from the fact of religious diversity even
if it would. The public schools may better
serve their students by acquainting them
with the normal incidence of religious differences which they will find in later life than
by attempting to create an illusory impression of uniformity where none exists.
That a majority of parents are likely to
choose religious instruction with resulting
psychological and social pressures on nonparticipants should be constitutionally irrelevant. If a majority of parents opted against
sectarian religious instruction, obviously the
pressures would then operate against participants. Yet no nonbeliever would allow a
believer to complain that the public authority under these circumstances was illegally
pressuring his child against religious instruction. In fact, that was precisely the situation
in the Champaign, Illinois junior high school
under the released-time program struck
down in McCollum. There 80% of the stu3 7
dents did not attend religious instruction.
The choice or rejection of religious instruction by a majority of parents, in my opinion,
should be accorded no constitutional weight.
The nontheist parent exercises a completely
free choice as long as an alternative truly
equal to religious instruction is available to
his child. What he really would object to in
such a case would be the opportunity for the
theist parent to choose a period of religious
instruction for his own child.
The contention of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
that released-time during school hours for
voluntary religious instruction coerced children to attend may also reflect the conviction
that the program there involved did not offer
37 Transcript of Trial Record, p. 177.
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an alternative which was in fact equally
attractive to nonparticipants. In my view, an
equal alternative is the crux of the whole
problem of released-time. Unless that condition is fully satisfied, then the built-in weight
of the program would favor the believer over
the nonbeliever or even. the organized believer over his unorganized brethren. The
principle of neutrality surely prohibits such
discriminatory treatment. But what constitutes an equal alternative?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Jackson conceded in Zorach what only the
most doctrinaire secularist would deny, that
the public school may close its doors to free
students to repair to a place outside the
school for religious devotions or instructions.3" This program would simply shorten
one school day and allow each student to
make what use he wishes of the "dismissedtime." Of such a program, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter rightly concluded, no nonbeliever would have grounds for complaint.
But parents of religious conviction may still
ask why they who enjoy the primary rights
may not specify religious instruction for their
children within the formal process of public
school education. In my opinion, "dismissedtime" is a step in the right direction but does
not fully honor the rights of parents as to the
formal education of their children within the
public schools themselves. Of course, administrative difficulties with released-time
programs may make religious instruction
after school hours the only practical solution. In that case, the religious classes could
be held on the school premises without violating the principle of neutrality as long as
the facilities were equally available to all
religious and ethical persuasions. Since the

classes would not constitute part of the
scholastic curriculum, the public school
would not be obliged to provide an alternative for nonparticipants. However, devising
a school bus schedule in rural and suburban
areas satisfactory to both participants and
nonparticipants might offer an insuperable
challenge to a "dismissed-time" program.
In McCollum, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
likewise appeared to approve a play period
as an alternative for the nonparticipants in
a released-time program of voluntary religious instruction, at least when conducted
off the school premises. That arrangement,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought, would
"not cut into public school instruction or
truly affect the activities or feelings of the
children who did not attend the church
schools." 39 Most children, I am sure, would
accept a recreation period as equal or superior to any instruction. But the nonparticipant in the released-time program, or at least
his parents, might well feel that a choice
restricted to a nonacademic period of recreation and a formal period of religious
instruction would be inherently weighted
against the former, since the nonparticipant's
schooling is altogether suspended while his
fellow students receive formal instruction. If
the primary purpose of a school is to instruct
and of a student to learn, then the nonparticipant in released-time may, with reason,
ask for secular instruction or extra-curricular activity as an alternative to religious
instruction. Of course, the play period might
be coupled with academic alternatives to
offer the nonparticipant a choice.
Far less attractive than recreation as an
alternative to religious instruction is a study

3s Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320, 323,
324 (1952).

39 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 34, at 224.
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period, which, even without the usual connotation of marking time scholastically, cannot claim equality to formal instruction.
Indeed, the fact that a study period was the
alternative offered to the nonparticipant in
the Illinois and New York released-time
programs may explain the decision in
McCollum and the dissent in Zorach. Terry
McCollum was required to attend a study
period during which he was often left to his
own devices.4" Similarly, under the New
York released-time program of religious
instruction off the school premises, schooling
was "more or less suspended" for nonreligious attendants."' This led Mr. Justice Jackson to charge that the New York program
served as a "temporary jail for a pupil who
will not go to Church." 42 In all probability,
the majority in McCollum and the dissenters
in Zorach would not have altered their opinion had the nonparticipants been offered a
different alternative. But they did object at
least in part, and with reason, to the equality
of a study period as the only alternative to
religious instruction.
On the other hand, any secular instruction
or extra-curricular activity scheduled at the
same time as the sectarian religious instruction would surely offer to nonparticipants a
fully equal alternative. We must recognize,
however, that limitations of space and staff
will tightly control the number of possible
academic alternatives to religious instruction, although the public school can and
must make at least one of these available to
nonparticipants in the released-time program. The additional alternative of a recreation period would both widen the nonparTranscript of Trial Record, p. 255; cf. Illinois

ticipant's option and relieve the strain on
academic facilities and faculties.
By a similar logic, the public school might
schedule objective courses about religion at
the time when sectarian religious instruction
was permitted. This would follow the dicta
in the opinions of Justices Clark, Brennan,
and Goldberg that teaching about religion
was secular, not religious, instruction. Unfortunately, the Justices did not clarify
exactly how teaching about religion differed
from the teaching of religion. The distinction
surely should not be taken to suggest that
the latter is maliciously biased or void of
intellectual content. Rather, the distinction
should be taken to express the fact that the
teaching of religion does not simply expose
the tenets of a particular religious creed but
also explains every reality, learning, and dissenting opinion related to those tenets. In
short, the teaching of religion, as distinguished from the teaching about religion,
presupposes and nourishes a particular religious faith. Undoubtedly the composition of
objective and graded courses about religion
would prove a challenge. But this is a type
of problem which has taxed the resources of
educators in all subjects. The lower grades
might begin with a descriptive study of the
religious history of this country, while the
higher grades might undertake a comparative analysis of the major communities of
religious belief. The courses might study the
Bible on various levels, as Mr. Justice Clark
suggested, "for its literary and historic qualities." -3
There is no reason, to be sure, why students who fulfill the requirements of secular
instruction, including instruction about religion, should not receive academic credit for

ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note
34, at 227.
41 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 38, at 324.
42 Ibid.

43 School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
supra note 26, at 225.
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their work. But may, or should, students
who attend sectarian religious instruction
have the same opportunity? There is nothing
in the nature of sectarian religious instruction, if genuinely informative and not devotional, to preclude scholastic standing. Many
colleges and universities, even those under
state auspices, grant credit for courses taken
in departments of theology. To deny that
religious instruction has intellectual content
would only betray hostile philosophical or
theological presuppositions. Yet, while
nothing in the nature of sectarian instruction, as such, conflicts with scholastic standing, the involvement of the state as supervisor of public education well might. Sectarian instruction in lower education would
not readily lend itself to the objective standards of higher education in the certification
of teachers or the composition of curricula.
Hence, the choice between state control over
religious instruction and religious instruction
without state supervision should rule out
academic credit for such courses. For similar reasons, the state should bear the expense
of the secular alternative to religious instruction but not that of the religious instruction
itself.
We should note that secular instruction at
state expense with academic credit at the
same time as religious instruction at sectarian expense without academic credit would
surely offer an equal alternative to students
who do not participate in the released-time
program. In fact, the alternative is more
attractive than the religious instruction. Yet
this paradox only serves to illustrate the deficiency of a purely quantitative analysis of
problems arising under the establishment
clause. The first amendment forbids the
state to prefer religious belief over disbelief
or disbelief over religious belief; it does not
prohibit apparent inequalities where the
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public authority acts for a reason which excludes a preferential design or weighting.
Here the state has ample grounds to deny
credit and support for sectarian religious
instruction, although the incidental result
is an apparent inequality in relation to the
alternate secular instruction.
Perhaps no released-time program would
prove administratively feasible if, contrary
to the experience of the thirteen states with
programs off the school premises," all or
most sects sought separate classes. Perhaps,
religious instruction during school hours in
public school classrooms could not be joined
to at least one equally attractive alternative
for nonparticipants without overtaxing the
facilities of the public school. 45 Perhaps, so
few parents and students would want religious instruction that the disproportionate
burden on public school space and time
would not justify the institution or continuance of a released-time program. But these
are all problems for the local school board,
not the courts. In my opinion, the constitutional mandate of governmental neutrality in
matters of belief and disbelief would be fully
(Continued on page 82)

44California, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
and West Virginia allow released-time under the
Zorach rule.
45 Administrative difficulties with religious in-

struction during school hours in public school
classrooms would not necessarily bar releasedtime off the school premises or dismissed-time on
the premises. We should note, however, that these
programs would create transportation problems in
rural and suburban areas. In the case of releasedtime off the school premises, the participating
children might lose most of that time in transportation to and from the place of instruction. In
the case of dismissed-time on the school premises,
the participating children might miss school bus
transportation to distant homes.

10
be unable to conduct an intelligent review
of obscenity decisions."
Today the area of obscenity has reached
a state of confusion because of the conflicting interpretations of the Roth case. The
principal case stands in opposition to the
recent trend which places emphasis on the
"redeeming social importance" in determining obscenity. This interpretation is questionable because of the increased danger of
infringing on the constitutional rights guaranteed the individual by the first amendment. On the other hand, it is advantageous
in that some form of censorship of obscene
material is absolutely essential to preserve a
33
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satisfied if the released-time program remained open to all sects and offered at least
one equal alternative to nonparticipants.
From what has been said to this point,
it should be clear that I agree with the many
commentators who regard McCollum and
Zorach as fundamentally inconsistent. In
my view, the released-time programs there
involved rise or fall together. If McCollum
is to be justified on the ground that the study
period offered to Terry McCollum did not
constitute a truly equal alternative to religious instruction, then Zorach was wrongly
decided because the same alternative was
there available. Following that interpretation of McCollum, however, would not
jeopardize the constitutionality of religious
instruction during school hours in public
school classrooms where a fully equal alternative is available to nonparticipants. On the
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high moral standard in the community, and
censorship will indeed be seriously impaired
if a work of minor "redeeming social importance" falls under the protection of the
first amendment. Therefore, perhaps the
true test should be the weighing of the
work's "prurient appeal" against its social
importance, the outcome determining
whether or not a work may be judged obscene. If the Supreme Court determines that
the protection of community morals is outweighed by the infringement of the first
amendment, it will have to clarify its position, and thus formulate guides for other
courts.34
3I

Ibid.
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other hand, -if McCollum and Zorach rest
on broader grounds, as appears likely, then
Zorach and not McCollum was the case
rightly decided.
I think that I have also made clear my belief that the two fundamental constitutional
principles involved in released-time programs for voluntary religious instruction are
the primacy of parental rights in the education of children and the necessity of an
equally attractive alternative for nonparticipants. If both principles are followed, then
I do not see how released-time can be condemned without violating the neutrality
between belief and disbelief which the Supreme Court has held the first amendment to
enjoin. In the matter of religious instruction
within the framework of formal education,
Americans must examine their consciences
and determine just how sincerely they accept
the primacy of parental rights. The result
should not be in doubt once the issue is fully
laid bare.

